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Abstract: Security is an important concern for service based systems, i.e., systems that are composed of autonomous 
and distributed software services. This is because the overall security of such systems depends on the 
security of the individual services they deploy and, hence, it is difficult to assess especially in cases where 
the latter services must be discovered and composed dynamically. This paper presents a novel approach for 
discovering secure compositions of software services. This approach is based on secure service 
orchestration patterns, which have been proven to provide certain security properties and can, therefore, be 
used to generate service compositions that are guaranteed to satisfy these properties by construction. The 
paper lays the foundations of the secure service orchestration patterns, and presents an algorithm that uses 
the patterns to generate secure service compositions and a tool realising our entire approach. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The security of service based systems (SBS), i.e., 
systems that make use of distributed and possibly 
dynamically assembled software services, has been a 
critical concern for both the users and providers of 
such systems (Raman et al., 2002; Majithia et al., 
2004; Anisetti et al., 2013). This is because the 
security of an SBS depends on the security of the 
individual services that it deploys, in complex ways 
that depend not only on the particular security 
properties of concern but also on the exact way in 
which these services are composed to form the SBS. 
Consider, for example, the case where the 
property required of an SBS is that the integrity of 
any data D, which are passed to it by an external 
client, will not be compromised by any of its 
constituent services that receive D. The assessment 
of this property requires knowledge of the exact 
services that constitute the SBS, the exact form of 
the composition of these services and the data flows 
between them, and a guarantee that each of the 
constituent services of SBS that receives D will 
preserve its integrity. Such assessments of security 
are required both during the design of an SBS and at 
runtime in cases where one of its constituent 
services S needs to be replaced and, due to the 
absence of any individual service matching it, a 
composition of services must be built to replace S. 
Whilst the construction of service compositions that 
satisfy functional and quality properties has received 
considerable attention in the literature (e.g., 
Aggarwal et al., 2004; Dustdar et al., 2005; Tan et 
al. 2009; Alrifai et al., 2012)., the construction of 
secure service compositions is not adequately 
supported by existing research. 
In this paper, we present an approach for 
discovering compositions of services, which are 
guaranteed to satisfy certain security properties. Our 
approach is based on the application of SEcure 
Service Orchestration patterns (SESO patterns). 
SESO patterns specify primitive service 
orchestrations, which are proven to have particular 
security properties, if the constituent services of the 
orchestration satisfy other security properties. A 
SESO pattern specifies the order of the execution of 
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its constituent services (e.g., sequential, parallel 
execution) and the data flows between them. It also 
specifies rules, which dictate the security properties 
that the constituent services of the orchestration 
must have for the orchestration to satisfy another 
security property as a whole. These rules express 
security property relations of the form IF P THEN 
∧i=1,…,nPi  where P is a security property that is 
required of the service orchestration as a whole and 
Pi are security properties of the constituent services, 
which must be satisfied for P to be guaranteed. The 
security property relations expressed by the rules are 
formally proven. The constituent services of a SESO 
pattern are abstract “placeholder” services that need 
to be instantiated by concrete services when the 
pattern is instantiated.  
When a constituent service S of an SBS needs to 
be replaced at runtime and no single alternative 
service S’ satisfying exactly the same security 
properties as S can be found, SESO patterns can be 
applied to discover compositions of other services 
that have exactly the same security properties as S 
and could replace it within SBS. SESO patterns 
determine the criteria (security, interface and 
functional) that should be satisfied by the services 
that could instantiate the orchestration specified by 
them. These criteria are used to drive a discovery 
process whose goal is to instantiate the pattern. If 
this discovery/pattern instantiation process is 
successful, i.e., different combinations of services 
that satisfy the required criteria and fit with the 
orchestration structure of the pattern can be 
discovered, any composition of services which is 
built from the pattern is guaranteed to have the 
required overall security property by-construction. 
An earlier account of our approach has been 
given in (Pino and Spanoudakis 2012a; Pino and 
Spanoudakis 2012b). In this paper, we present the 
method that underpins the proof of security 
properties in SESO patterns, show examples of 
concrete proofs of security properties for specific 
SESO patterns, and present an amended version of 
the original composition algorithm that makes use of 
coarse-grained service workflows in the composition 
process in order to find service compositions that are 
not only secure but also functionally relevant to the 
service that is needed. In addition, we describe a tool 
that implements our approach.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. 
Section 2 presents an overview of our approach. 
Section 3 discusses the validation of the security of 
primitive service orchestration patterns and provides 
examples of proofs of security properties for some 
of these patterns. Section 4 discusses the encoding of 
secure service orchestration patterns. Section 5 
presents the new pattern driven secure service 
composition algorithm. Section 6 provides an 
overview of the tool that we have developed to 
implement our approach. Finally, Section 7 
overviews related work and Section 8 provides 
conclusions and directions for future work.  
2 OVERVIEW 
The service composition approach that we present in 
this paper is part of a general framework developed 
at City University to support runtime service 
discovery (Zisman et al., 2013). This framework 
supports service discovery driven by queries 
expressed in an XML based query language, called 
SerDiQueL, which supports the specification of 
interface, behavioural and quality discovery criteria. 
The execution of queries can be reactive or 
proactive. In reactive execution, the SBS submits a 
query to the framework and gets back any services 
matching the query that the latter can find. In 
proactive execution, the SBS submits to the 
framework queries that are executed in parallel, to 
find potential replacement services that could be 
used if needed, without the need to initiate and wait 
for the results of the discovery process at this point 
(Zisman et al., 2013). 
To take into account service security 
requirements as part of the service discovery 
process, we have extended the above framework in 
two ways: (i) we have extended SerDiQueL to 
enable the specification of the security properties 
that are required of individual services, as querying 
conditions, and (ii) we have developed a 
composition module supporting the construction of 
possible compositions of services that could replace 
a given service in an SBS in cases where a query 
cannot find any single replacement service, based on 
the approach that we present in this paper. A 
detailed description of the extended version of 
SerDiQueL (called A-SerDiQueL) that is used for (i) 
and (ii) is beyond the scope of this paper and can be 
found in (Spanoudakis et al., 2011). In this paper, we 
focus on the process of searching for and 
constructing secure service compositions. The key 
problems during the composition process are to 
ensure that the constructed composition of services: 
(a) provides the functionality of the service that it 
should replace, and (b) satisfies the security 
properties required of this service. 
To address (a), our approach uses abstract 
service workflows. These workflows express service 
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coordination processes that realize known business 
processes through the use of software services with 
fixed interfaces. Such workflows are available for 
specific application domains such as telecom 
services (IBM BPM Industry Packs), logistics 
(RosettaNet), and are often available as part of SOA 
architecting and realization platforms (e.g., IBM 
WebSphere). Service workflows are encoded in an 
XML based language that represents the interfaces, 
and the control and data flow between the 
workflow's composing activities. 
To address (b), we are using the SESO patterns. 
These patterns are based on primitive service 
orchestrations that have been proposed in the 
literature (e.g., sequential and parallel service 
execution) but augment them by specifying concrete 
security properties P1, ..., Pn that must be provided 
by the individual services that instantiate the pattern 
for the overall orchestration to satisfy a required 
security property P0. The derivation of these security 
properties is based on rules that encode formally 
proven relations between the security properties of 
the individual placeholder services of the pattern and 
the security property required of the entire service 
orchestration represented by the pattern. Once 
derived through the application of rules, the security 
properties required of the individual partner services 
of the orchestration are expressed as queries in A-
SerDiQueL. These queries are then executed to 
identify concrete services with the required security 
properties, which could instantiate the placeholder 
services of the pattern. If such services are found the 
pattern is instantiated. The pattern instantiation 
process is gradual and, if it is completed 
successfully, a new concrete and executable service 
composition that satisfies the overall security 
property guaranteed by the pattern is generated. 
A key element of our approach is the formal 
validation of the relations between the security 
properties of the individual placeholder services of a 
SESO pattern and the security property of the entire 
composition expressed by the pattern. The validation 
of such relations is discussed in the next section. 
3 VALIDATING SECURE 
SERVICE COMPOSITIONS 
The task of formally validating the security of a 
service composition requires a three-step approach. 
It starts with a formal model of the service to be 
replaced and the formal models of the services to be 
composed. Firstly, the service composition is 
represented in terms of a formal model derived from 
the models of the individual services by applying a 
set of formal construction rules. These rules project 
the respective security properties of each of the 
composed services as well as the targeted property 
of the service to be replaced into the composed 
system. Secondly, additional properties are added to 
the composed system regarding the behaviour of the 
orchestration engine, i.e., the primitive service 
orchestration pattern. Finally, the desired property is 
verified using the properties of the composed 
services and the orchestrator. 
For the formal system representation and 
validation of security properties we utilize the 
Security Modeling Framework SeMF developed by 
Fraunhofer SIT (Gürgens et al., 2005b). In SeMF, a 
system specification is composed of a set ℙ of 
agents and a set ∑ of actions, ∑/P denoting the 
actions of agent P, and other system specifics that 
are not needed in this paper and are thus omitted. 
The behaviour B of a discrete system Sys can then 
be formally described by the set of its possible 
sequences of actions. Security properties are defined 
in terms of such a system specification. Relations 
between different formal models of systems are 
partially ordered with respect to different levels of 
abstraction. Formally, abstractions are described by 
so called alphabetic language homomorphisms that 
map action sequences of a finer abstraction level to 
action sequences of a more abstract level while 
respecting concatenation of actions. Language 
homomorphisms satisfying specific conditions are 
proven to preserve specific security properties, the 
conditions depending on the respective security 
property. A detailed account of SeMF is beyond the 
scope of this paper can be found in (Fuchs and 
Gürgens, 2011; Fuchs et al., 2011; Gürgens et al., 
2005a; Gürgens et al., 2002) for.  
Based on the representations of each of the 
service systems in the composition, we present a 
general construction rule using homomorphisms that 
map the service composition onto the individual 
services by preserving the individual services' 
security properties. This allows us to deduce the 
respective security properties to be satisfied by the 
composition. The different SESO patterns are 
translated into behaviour of the orchestrator 
regarding the invocation of the respective services. 
This includes functional and security related 
property statements. Based on this information it is 
possible to deduce the overall security properties of 
the composition system and validate whether they 
meet the expected results. In the next three sections, 
we illustrate our approach by exemplarily proving a 
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specific data integrity property. The formal 
representation of services, composition and security 
properties is given in terms of generic agents and 
actions that are later used by the SESO patterns for 
instantiation towards concrete services and security 
properties. While our example is a very simple one, 
our approach can handle more complex service 
models, e.g. involving global agents (unique to all 
services), or service specific agents (e.g. backend 
storage) as well as various different orchestrations 
patterns, proving different instantiations of various 
security properties regarding integrity and 
confidentiality (Pino et al., 2012). 
3.1 Formal Representation of Generic 
Service Composition 
In the following, we denote the system model of the 
service S
0
 to be replaced by a composition by Sys
0
, 
the system models of the services S
1
 and S
2
 to be 
composed by Sys
1
 and Sys
2
, respectively, and the 
composition system by Sys
c
. The sets of agents and 
actions are denoted analogously (i.e. by ℙ!, ∑
i
, for 
i=0, 1, 2). We then view the systems Sys
0
, Sys
1
 and 
Sys
2
 as homomorphic images of the composed 
system Sys
c
.  
 
Figure 1: Service Composition. 
The principal idea of substituting a service by a 
service composition is depicted in Figure 1: we 
assume services S
1
 and S
2
 to act independently of 
(i.e., not to invoke) each other. Thus we utilize an 
orchestration engine O for their composition that 
takes the role of both the clients C
1
 and C
2
 of Sys
1
 
and Sys
2
 respectively, as well as the role of the 
service S
0
 in Sys
0
 to be replaced. We formalize this 
by using a generic renaming function !!→!: ∑ →
∑!!→! that replaces all occurrences of agent P in an 
action by Q. Based on this function, we define 
functions r
i
 : ∑
i
 → ∑
c
  (i = 0, 1, 2) as follows: 
 
!
!(!) ∶=   !
!
!
→!
(!) if ! ∈  ∑/!!
!
∪ ∑/!!
!
!
!(!) ∶=   !
!
!
→!
(!) if ! ∈  ∑
/!!
!
∪ ∑
/!!
!  
 
(j = 1, 2). The resulting set ∑
c
 of actions of the 
composed system is then as follows:  
 
∑! = !!(∑
/!!
!
∪ ∑
/!!
!
) ∪ !!(∑!) ∪ !!(∑!) ∪ ∑/!
!  
 
∑/!
!  represents additional actions taken by the 
orchestration engine beyond the communication 
with  client and services. These actions depend on 
the specific orchestration pattern used and will be 
discussed in the next section. Since the functions r
i
 
are injective we can now use their inverse image in 
order to define the homomorphisms that map the 
composition system onto the abstract systems: each 
homomorphism h
i
 abstracts ∑
c
 to ∑
i
. Regarding the 
actions corresponding to those in ∑
i
, h
i
 is simply the 
inverse of r
i
, and all other actions are mapped onto 
the empty word. Hence for i = 0, 1, 2, we define h
i
 : 
∑
c
 → ∑
i
 as follows:  
 
ℎ
!(!) =
!′ if ∃!′ ∈ ∑!: !!(!′) = !
! else
 
 
These homomorphisms serve as a means to relate 
not only the models of the individual systems to the 
composition model but also to relate - under certain 
conditions - their security properties. A 
homomorphism that fulfils certain conditions 
“transports” a security property from an abstract 
system to the concrete one, i.e. if the conditions are 
satisfied and the property holds in the abstract 
system, the corresponding property will also hold in 
the concrete system. Thus, the homomorphism 
preserves the property. The conditions that must be 
satisfied depend on the property in question; see 
(Gürgens et al., 2005a; Gürgens et al., 2002) for 
example. We use this approach to prove specific 
security properties for a composition of services 
based on the security properties of these services. 
3.2 Formally Representing Sequential 
Composition 
The actions of the systems are constructed from the 
service operations op0, op1, and op2 as prefix, 
followed by one of the suffixes IS, IR, OS, OR to 
represent InputSend, InputReceive, OutputSend, 
OutputReceive, respectively.  This results in the 
following agent and action sets:  
 
S0
C0
⇔
S1 S2
O
C0
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ℙ
!
⊇ {!! , !!},∑! ⊇
!"!– !" !
! , !! ,!"#"! ,
!"!– !" !
! ,!! ,!"#"! ,
!"!–!"(!
! ,!! , !!(!"#"!)),
!"!–!"(!
! , !! , !!(!"#"!))
 
 
In our simple example of a sequential 
composition pattern, the orchestrator forwards data0 
received from C
0
 to S
1
 which returns f1(data0). These 
data are then forwarded by the orchestrator to S
2
 
who returns f2(f1(data0)) which  the orchestrator 
finally returns to the client. In a more complex 
scenario the orchestrator can for example alter (e.g., 
split) the client data and combine the output of S
1
 
with some data resulting from the client's input and 
send this to S
2
.  A proof for this more complex 
construction is achievable analogously to the one 
presented below.   
The agent and action sets of the composition are 
constructed as specified in the previous section, 
using the functions r
0
, r
1
 and r
2
. Function r
0
 for 
example maps action op0-IS(C
0
, S
0
, data0) onto op0-
IS(C
0
, O, data0), hence h
0
(op0-IS(C
0
, O, data0)) = 
op0-IS(C
0
, S
0
, data0), while h
0
(op2-OR(O, S
2
, 
f2(data2))) = h
0
(r
2
(op2-OR(C
2
, S
2
, f2(data2)))) = !., 
with data1 := data0 and data2 := f1(data1). 
3.3 Validation of Integrity Preserving 
Compositions 
Exemplarily, we will now prove that a specific data 
integrity property of S
0
 is provided by the 
orchestration specified above. The definition of 
(data) integrity that we assume in our example is 
taken from RFC4949: “The property that data has 
not been changed, destroyed, or lost in an 
unauthorized or accidental manner.” (Shirey, 2007). 
In SeMF, this property is expressed by the concept 
of precedence:  pre(a,b) holds if all sequences of 
actions ω ∈ B that contain action b also contain 
action a. Obviously, precedence is transitive (we 
omit the trivial proof). Further, precedence is 
preserved by any homomorphism (Fuchs and 
Gürgens, 2011). 
 Let us now assume that service S
0
 provides the 
integrity property that whenever the client receives 
f0(data0) from the service, the client has sent data0 to 
this service before: 
P1’ pre(op0-IS(C
0
, S
0
, data0), op0-OR(C
0
, S
0
, 
f0(data0))) 
As explained above, precedence is preserved by 
h
0 
(as constructed in Section 3.1). Hence the 
corresponding property of the composition is 
(assuming f0 = f2°f1): 
P1 pre(op0-IS(C
0
, O, data0), op0-OR(C
0
, O, 
f2(f1(data0)))) 
For our proof, we assume that the services Sys
1
 
and Sys
2
 provide the properties:  
P2’ pre(op1-IS(C
1
, S
1
, data1), op1-OR(C
1
, S
1
, 
f1(data1))) 
P3’ pre(op2-IS(C
2
, S
2
, data2), op2-OR(C
2
, S
2
, 
f2(data2))) 
The homomorphisms h
1 
and h
2
 as constructed in 
Section 3.1 preserve these precedence properties. 
Accordingly, the corresponding properties in Sys
c
 
are: 
P2 pre(op1-IS(O, S
1
, data0), op1-OR(O, S
1
, 
f1(data0))) 
P3 pre(op2-IS(O, S
2
, f1(data0)), op2-OR(O, S
2
, 
f2(f1(data0)))) 
In addition, the orchestrator must act according 
to the pattern (as specified in Section 3.2), i.e., 
satisfy the following properties:  
P4 pre(op0-IS(C
0
, O, data), op1-IS(O, S
1
, data)) 
P5 pre(op1-OR(O, S
1
, data), op2-IS(O, S
2
, data)) 
P6 pre(op2-OS(O, C
0
, f2(f1(data0))), op2-OR(C
0
, 
O, f2(f1(data0)))) 
Proof. By transitivity of precedence, from properties 
P2 to P6 we can conclude that property P1 holds.  
The above proof is almost trivial but shows the 
principle of our approach. In (Pino et al., 2012) we 
have proven more complex integrity properties 
involving actions of global agents being invoked by 
either S
1
 or S
2
, as well as several confidentiality 
properties. All proofs use the approach presented in 
this paper: (i) deriving the formal model of the 
service composition from the formal models of the 
individual services, (ii) relating these models by 
using property preserving homomorphisms and thus 
representing the individual services' security 
properties in terms of the composition model, and 
(iii) using appropriate security properties to be 
satisfied by the orchestrator. Whilst we assume the 
orchestrator to behave correctly and hence to satisfy 
these additional properties, the security properties 
we assume for the individual services of the 
composition are translated into inference rules, 
which are then used in order to construct a service 
composition. It should also be noted that the proofs 
of security properties for specific SESO patterns 
need to be constructed offline and encoded in the 
patterns as rules, as we discuss in Sect. 4 below. At 
runtime, the rules encoded in specific pattern are 
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used to deduce the security properties that need to be 
satisfied by the candidate services that can 
instantiate the pattern. 
4 SECURE SERVICE 
ORCHESTRATION PATTERNS 
Proofs of security properties, like the one that we 
discussed in Section 3, form the basis of SESO 
patterns in our approach. More specifically, an 
SESO pattern encodes: (a) a primitive orchestration 
describing the order of the execution and the data 
flow between placeholder services, and (b) the 
implications between the security properties of these 
services and the security property of the whole 
orchestration. The placeholder services within a 
primitive orchestration can be atomic activities (i.e., 
abstract partner services) or other patterns. The 
implications in (b) are of the form: 
“IF P is a primitive orchestration with 
placeholders S1, …, Sn and ρ
P
 is a 
security property required for P THEN ρ
P
 
can be guaranteed if each Si in P 
satisfies a set of security properties 
ρj (j =1, …, mi)”. 
These implications reflect proofs of security 
properties, developed based on the approach 
discussed in Sect. 3. They are encoded as inference 
rules and used during the composition process to 
infer the security properties that would be required 
of the placeholders of a pattern P for it to satisfy ρ
P
. 
The benefit of encoding proven implications as 
inference rules is that there is no need to reason from 
first-principles when attempting to construct 
compositions of services, based on SESO patterns. 
To be more specific, SESO patterns and 
implications of the above form are encoded as 
Drools production rules (Drools). Drools is a rule-
based reasoning system supporting reasoning driven 
by production rules. Production rules in Drools are 
used to derive information from data facts stored in a 
Knowledge Base (KB). A production rule in Drools 
has the general form: when <conditions> then 
<actions>. When a rule is applied, the rule engine 
of Drools checks, through pattern matching, whether 
the conditions of the rule match with the facts in the 
KB and, if they do, it executes actions of the rule. 
This execution can update the contents of the KB by 
adding or deleting facts in it. The reasoning process 
of Drools is based on the Rete algorithm a pattern-
matching algorithm that is known to scale well for 
large sets of data facts and rules (Forgy, 1982);. The 
latter property of Drools is the main reason for 
selecting it to represent and reason with SESO 
patterns in our approach. 
Table 1 shows the encoding of integrity in the 
sequential orchestration pattern that was presented in 
Section 3.3 as a Drools rule. In particular our rule 
uses the following definition of integrity: 
Definition 2. Integrity(S, x, y) = pre(op0-IS(C
0
, S, x), 
op0-OR(0
0
, S, y)) 
Using such more abstract security properties in 
the rules avoids the need to encode in the rule the 
formalism that the proof is based on. This makes it 
also possible to use SESO patterns proven through 
different formalisms in our approach. 
Returning to the rule in Table 1, Lines 3-5 
describe the primitive orchestration that the security 
property refers to. More specifically, the rule can be 
applied when a sequential pattern ($P) with two 
placeholders, i.e., activity $S1 followed by activity 
$S2, is encountered. The rule defines the parameters 
of these activities: $S1 has an input parameter $d 
and an output parameter $f1d, and $S2 has an 
input parameter $f1d and an output parameter 
$f2f1d, as shown in Table 1. Line 6 describes the 
original security requirement requested on the 
composition pattern $rhoP, i.e. integrity on the 
pattern $P of its data $d and $f2f1d. This 
requirement is equivalent to the precedence property 
P1 presented in Section 3.3. Lines 8-9 (i.e., the 
Table 1: Integrity Rule for Sequential SESO Pattern. 
1:  rule "Integrity - Sequential Orchestration" 
2:   when 
3:     $S1 := Activity($d := inputs, $f1d := outputs) 
4:     $S2 := Activity($f1d := inputs, $f2f1d := outputs) 
5:     $P := Sequential($S1 := activ1, $S2 := activ2) 
 
6:     $rhoP : Integrity($P := subject, $d := inputs, $f2f1d := outputs) 
7:   then 
8:     insert(new Integrity($S1, $d, $f1d)); 
9:     insert(new Integrity($S2, $f1d, $f2f1d)); 
10:    retract($rhoP); 
11: end 
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then part of the rule) specify the security properties 
that are required of the activities of the pattern in 
order to guarantee $rhoP, namely: (i) integrity on 
the input ($d) and output ($f1d) of $S1, as stated 
by the precedence property P2, and (ii) integrity on 
the input ($f1d) and output ($f2f1d) of $S2, as 
required from P3. Additionally, we assume the 
framework executing the orchestration to satisfy 
properties P4–P6, hence these need not be 
mentioned in the rule. Finally, according to the rule, 
once the original requirement $rhoP is guaranteed 
by the new ones, it can be removed from the KB. 
Similar encodings of other SESO patterns have 
been expressed using this approach but cannot be 
discussed due to space limitations. SESO pattern 
encoding rules, like the one presented above, are 
used during the composition process to infer the 
security properties that are required of the concrete 
services that may instantiate the placeholder services 
in a workflow. This process is discussed next.  
5 SESO PATTERN DRIVEN 
SERVICE COMPOSITION 
The service composition process is carried out 
according to the algorithm shown in Table 2. This 
algorithm is invoked when an SBS service needs to 
be replaced but the service discovery query specified 
for it cannot identify any single service matching its 
conditions. 
In such cases, the structural part of the query, 
which defines the operations that a service should 
have and the data types of the parameters of these 
operations, is used to retrieve from the repository of 
the discovery framework abstract workflows that 
can provide the required service functionality. An 
abstract workflow represents a coarse grained 
orchestration of activities, which collectively offer a 
specific functionality, and is exposed as a composite 
service. Such workflows are fairly common 
(Carminati et al., 2006; Medjahed et al., 2003) and 
result from the generation of reference process 
models in specific domains as in (RosettaNet; IBM 
BPM Industry Packs). The activities of an abstract 
workflow are orchestrated through a process 
consisting of the primitive orchestrations that 
underpin the security patterns, as discussed in 
Section 4. If such workflows are found the 
generation of a service composition is attempted by 
trying to instantiate each abstract workflow.  
As shown in Table 2, initially, the algorithm 
identifies the abstract workflows that could be 
potentially used to generate a composition that can 
provide the operations of the required service (see 
STRUCTURALMATCH function in line 3). This is based 
on the execution of the query associated with the 
Table 2: Service Composition Algorithm. 
Require: QS - query for the required service 
Ensure: ResultSet - set of instantiated workflows 
1:  procedure SERVICECOMPOSITION(QS) 
2:    for all abstract workflows AW in the repository do 
3:      if STRUCTURALMATCH(QS, AW) == true then 
4:        Put a copy of AW in WStack 
5:      end if 
6:    end for 
7:    while there are more workflows in WStack do 
8:      Get the first workflow W in the WStack 
9:      Pop the first unassigned activity A from W 
10:     Extract the structural query QA for A from W 
11:     SecCond := SECURITYCONDITIONS(QS, W) 
12:     Add to QA the security conditions SecCond 
13:     Res := SERVICEDISCOVERY(QA) 
14:     for all services S* in Res do 
15:       WS* := W[A/S*]               //i.e. substitute S* for A in W 
16:       if exists an unassigned activity in WS* then 
17:         Push WS* in WStack 
18:       else 
19:         Add WS* to ResultSet 
20:       end if 
21:     end for 
22:   end while 
23:   return ResultSet 
24: end procedure 
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service to be replaced (QS). If such workflows are 
found, the algorithm continues by starting a process 
of instantiating the activities of each of the found 
workflows with services.  
The activities of the workflows are instantiated 
progressively, by investigating each workflow W in a 
depth-first manner. More specifically, the algorithm 
takes the first unassigned activity A in W (in the 
control flow order) and builds a query QA based on 
the workflow specification and the discovery query 
QS. In particular, the structural part of QA is taken 
from the description of A in the abstract workflow. 
The security conditions in QA are generated through 
the procedure SECURITYCONDITIONS(QS,W). This 
procedure infers the security conditions for A based 
on the Drools rules that encode the SESO patterns 
detected within the current workflow. More 
specifically, all the information about the workflow, 
its patterns, activities, security properties and 
requirements are put into the KB. Then the rules that 
represent the detected SESO patterns are fired (i.e. 
applied), propagating the requirements through the 
workflow. The generated requirements for the 
unassigned activity are then retrieved and converted 
to query conditions. The propagation of security 
requirements is possible thanks to the fact that each 
workflow can be seen as a recursive application of 
primitive orchestrations.  
Figure 2 shows the order of propagation through 
the use of the rules, on a workflow shown in (c). A 
security requirement ρ
S
 is initially given for a service 
S (Figure 2 (a)). The first rule that will be fired by 
Drools is the one for the outermost pattern of the 
workflow: a choice pattern (i.e., the if-then-else 
primitive orchestration in Figure 2 (b)). The security 
requirement is then propagated by the relevant rule 
(if such a rule exists) to the placeholders A and B 
returning the requirements ρ
A1
, …, ρ
An
 and ρ
B1
, …, 
ρ
Bm
 (with n, m ≥ 0 and n+m ≥ 1). For each security 
requirement ρ
Ai
 (with i=1, …, n), a rule is fired to 
propagate the requirement to the sequential pattern 
that instantiates A (Figure 2 (c)). This process 
generates the security requirements for placeholders 
C and D. 
If a security requirement cannot be propagated to 
the atomic activity level (e.g., no rules are defined 
for the given pattern or security property) then 
Drools returns an error state to point out that a 
security requirement cannot be guaranteed by the 
existing set of rules. This ensures that no security 
requirements are ignored.  
After constructing QA, the query is executed by 
the runtime discovery framework in (Zisman et al., 
2012) to identify a list of candidate services for QA. 
The candidate services in this list (if any) are then 
used to instantiate the activity A in W. Note that the 
composition algorithm implements a depth-first 
search in the composition process in order to explore 
fully the instantiation of a particular activity within a 
pattern before considering other activities, as this is 
expected to spot dead-ends sooner than a breadth-
first search. 
Figure 2: Recursive application of secure service 
orchestration patterns. 
5.1 Example 
As an example of applying the algorithm in Table 2, 
consider a Stock Broker SBS that uses an operation 
GetStockQuote from a service StockQuote to obtain 
price quotations for given stocks. GetStockQuote 
takes as input a string Symbol identifying a stock and 
returns the current value of that stock in USD. 
Suppose that the Stock Broker SBS has a 
security requirement regarding integrity of the input 
and output data of this operation, and would 
consider replacement services that can offer the 
same operation only if they have certificates 
confirming the satisfaction of this particular security 
requirement by the service. To deal with potential 
problems with StockQuote at runtime (e.g., 
unavailability), Stock Broker can subscribe a service 
discovery query QSQ for replacing StockQuote to the 
discovery framework and request its execution of 
proactive mode. QSQ should specify the functional 
and security properties that the potential replacement 
services of StockQuote must have. If the execution 
of QSQ results in discovering no single service 
matching it (i.e., when single service discovery 
fails), the service composition process is carried out. 
At this stage, according to the algorithm of Table 2, 
the framework will query the abstract workflow 
repository to locate workflows matching QSQ. 
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Suppose that this identifies an abstract workflow 
WSQ shown in Figure 3 that matches the query. WSQ 
contains three activities connected by two sequential 
patterns (see two dashed areas of workflow). The 
first placeholder of the outer sequence contains the 
activity GetISIN, which converts the Symbol 
identifying the Stock into the ISIN (another unique 
stock identifier). The second placeholder 
corresponds to the inner sequence. Within this inner 
sequence, the first placeholder is the activity 
GetEURQuote that returns the current stock value in 
EUR given the Stock ISIN. The second placeholder 
is the activity EURtoUSD, which converts a given 
amount from EUR to USD. 
Figure 3: Abstract Workflow WSQ. 
The framework then infers the security properties 
required for each of the services that could 
instantiate the activities and uses them to query for 
such services. Initially, the rule shown in Table 1 is 
fired given the property required for the external 
sequential pattern, i.e. integrity on inputs and 
outputs of the workflow (i.e. Symbol and USD 
value). From the required security property, the rule 
derives two more properties: (1) integrity on inputs 
and outputs of GetISIN (i.e. Symbol and ISIN), and 
(2) integrity on inputs and outputs of the sequential 
inner pattern representing the second activity (i.e. 
ISIN and USD value). The second property fires 
again the rule and this propagates the requirement 
for integrity of the ISIN and USD value, resulting in 
the two properties: integrity on GetEURQuote of 
ISIN and EUR value, and integrity on EURtoUSD of 
EUR value and USD value.  
After the application of the rules, we derive the 
required property for the first unassigned activity 
GetISIN, namely integrity of the input Symbol and 
the output ISIN. A query consisting of the interface 
and the security property required for GetISIN is 
then executed and the discovered services are used 
to instantiate the workflow. Note that in the 
discovery process, services are considered to satisfy 
the required security properties only if they have 
appropriate certificates asserting these properties. In 
a similar way, a query specifying the required 
interface and security property of integrity is created 
for the second (GetEURQuote) and the last activity 
(EURtoUSD). Each query is executed, and the 
workflow gets instantiated by the results.  After the 
replacement service is fully composed, the service 
composition is published in a BPEL execution 
engine and its WSDL is sent to the Stock Broker 
SBS in order to update its bindings. 
6 TOOL SUPPORT & 
EXPERIMENTS 
To implement and test our approach, we have 
developed a prototype realizing the composition 
process and integrated it with the runtime service 
discovery tool described in Section 2. The prototype 
gives the possibility to select a service discovery 
query and execute it to find potential candidate 
services and service compositions. If alternative 
service compositions can be built, the alternatives 
are presented to the user who can select and explore 
the services in each of them. Figure 4 shows the 
results of an execution in the case of the example in 
Section 5.1. These include two alternative service 
compositions; see GetUSDStockQuote-Wf1-0 and 
GetUSDStockQuote-Wf1-1 in the Ranking-1 panel 
(the appearance of the two compositions in the same 
line in the panel indicates that there is no ranking 
between these two compositions). If one of these 
compositions is selected, details about the service 
operations that have instantiated the abstract 
workflow activities are shown in the Composition 
Details panel. In this case, the abstract workflow 
with the two nested sequences of activities has been 
instantiated by sequential(GetISIN, 
sequential(GetEURQuote, EURtoUSD)).  
 
Figure 4: Screenshot of Composition tool. 
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Then, by selecting an activity in the workflow, 
the details of the service instantiating the selected 
activity are shown. These can be the WSDL 
description, the required security properties that the 
patterns generated for the query that was used to 
identify the service, and the certificates that 
demonstrated the satisfaction of these properties 
during the composition process. The bottom part of 
Figure 4 shows the required security properties that 
were used in the query for the service 
GetEURQuote. 
Early performance tests of our approach have 
been carried out using service registries of different 
sizes. Table 3 shows average execution times for 
single service and service composition discovery 
obtained from using our tool on an Intel Core i3 
CPU (3.06 GHz) with 4 GB RAM. The reported 
times are average times taken over 30 executions of 
a discovery query. In the experiments, we used 
service registries of four sizes (150, 300, 600 and 
1200), 25 abstract workflows and 3 patterns.  
Table 3: Execution times (in milliseconds) w.r.t. service 
registry size and number of generated compositions. 
Registry size 150 300 600 1200 
Single Service 
Discovery Time 
194 275 355 642 
Composition 
Discovery Time 
777 2214 4943 12660 
No. of generated 
Compositions 
4 12 24 40 
 
As shown in the table, the time required for 
building service compositions is considerably higher 
than the time required for single service discovery. 
The main part of this cost comes from the process of 
discovering the individual services to instantiate the 
partner links of the composition. 
Although the overall composition time is high, 
its impact is not as significant, since as we discussed 
in Sect. 2 our framework can apply discovery and 
service composition in a proactive manner, i.e., 
discover possible service compositions in parallel 
with the operation of an SBS and use them when a 
service needs to be replaced. Furthermore, the cost 
of compositions can be reduced or kept under a 
given threshold by controlling the number of 
alternative compositions that the algorithm in Table 
2 builds. 
Whilst the benefits of the proactive approach 
have been shown in (Zisman et al., 2013) for the 
case of single service discovery, further 
experimentation is required to explore the same for 
the composition and assess the effect on 
performance of controls over the number of 
generated compositions. 
7 RELATED WORK 
The main focus of existing work in service 
composition is to address the problem of creating 
compositions that have certain functional and quality 
of service (QoS) property (Raman et al., 2002; 
Ponnekanti et al., 2002; Fujii et al., 2004; Majithia et 
al., 2004; Jaeger et al., 2004; Aggarwal et al., 2004; 
Dustdar et al., 2005; Tan et al. 2009; Alrifai et al., 
2012). This work provides a foundation for 
functional and QoS properties but provides only 
basic support for addressing security properties in 
service composition, which is the main focus of our 
approach. 
The problem of supporting security requirements 
(properties) in service composition has been a focus 
of work in the area of model based service 
composition. In this area, service compositions are 
modeled using formal languages and their required 
properties are expressed as properties on the model 
(Deubler et al., 2004; Dong et al., 2010; Bartoletti et 
al., 2005). Our approach to composition is also 
model based but uses model based property proofs 
to identify how overall security properties of 
compositions can be guaranteed through propagation 
to properties on the individual components 
(services) of the composition. Works in this field, 
however, provide proofs of additional security 
properties that could be used to extend the patterns 
used in our approach, even if they use different 
formalisms. An example of such proofs is given in 
(Mantel, 2002), which presents compositionality 
results related to information flows (e.g. non-
interference) and that can be easily converted into 
SESO patterns and inference rules in our framework. 
Another strand of work on automatic service 
composition focuses on discovering services that can 
guarantee given security properties (Carminati et al., 
2006; Medjahed et al., 2003; Lelarge et al., 2006; 
Anisetti et al., 2013; Khan et al., 2012). Some of 
these approaches focus on specific types of security 
properties (Medjahed et al., 2003; Lelarge et al., 
2006), whilst others (Carminati et al., 2006; Anisetti 
et al., 2013; Khan et al., 2012) focus on how to 
express and check security properties only for single 
partner services of a composition. In contrast, our 
approach can support arbitrary security properties 
and properties of entire service compositions. 
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The approaches in (Medjahed et al., 2003) and in 
(Khan et al., 2012) describe two ontology-based 
frameworks for automatic composition. The former 
work defines a set of metrics for selecting amongst 
different compositions but provides limited support 
for security. The latter work introduces hierarchies 
of security properties and mentions the possibility of 
using rules to reason about them but does not 
support the construction of secure service 
compositions. Lelarge et al., (2006) use planning 
techniques to build sequential compositions that 
guarantee the adoption of access control models. 
Carminati et al., (2006) introduce an approach to 
security aware service composition that matches 
security requirements with the external service 
properties. The approach presented in (Anisetti et 
al., 2013) focuses on the generation of test-based 
virtual security certificates for service compositions 
derived from the test-based security certificates of 
the external services part of the composition. The 
service compositions are based on templates that 
allow expressing security requirements on the 
external services. The ideas underlining this 
approach can be used to extend the one presented in 
this paper to support the generation of virtual 
certificates for compositions.  
The secure orchestration patterns that we use in 
our framework are similar to the workflow patterns 
in (Van Der Aalst et al., 2003), as they specify 
elementary workflows used to build compositions. 
Our patterns, however, include information not only 
about the control flow within the pattern but also 
about the data flow. They also extend these patterns 
with information regarding security properties to 
hold for the individual services in order to guarantee 
that their composition satisfies a required security 
property. 
8 CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we have presented an approach 
supporting the discovery of secure service 
compositions. Our approach is based on secure 
service orchestration (SESO) patterns. These 
patterns comprise specifications of primitive 
orchestrations describing the order of the execution 
and the data flow between placeholder services, and 
rules reflecting formally proven implications 
between the security properties of the individual 
placeholders and the security property of the 
orchestration as a whole. The formal proofs (and 
patterns) achieved so far cover different integrity 
and confidentiality properties for various forms of 
primitive orchestrations. The extension of our 
approach to cover other security properties (e.g., 
availability) is subject of ongoing work. During the 
composition process, the proven implications are 
used to deduce the actual properties that should be 
required of the individual services that may 
instantiate an orchestration for the orchestration as a 
whole to satisfy specific security properties. 
In order to facilitate reasoning, SESO patterns 
are encoded as Drools rules. This enables the use of 
the Drools rule based system for inferring the 
required service security properties when trying to 
generate a service composition. 
Our approach has been implemented and 
integrated with a generic framework supporting 
runtime service discovery that has been described in 
(Zisman et al., 2012). We are currently investigating 
the validity of our approach through a series of focus 
group evaluations. We are also conducting further 
performance and scalability analysis of our 
prototype, focusing on exploring the effect of a 
proactive composition generation approach and 
setting heuristic controls over the number of 
compositions generated by the algorithm.  
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